preface
|| intro || 1 || 2
|| 3 || 4 || 5
|| 6 || 7 || 8
|| 9 || 10 || Epil
|| Biblio
Foundations
of Philosophy
Introduction
1. Foundations. To my surprise I discovered that there
are a group of contemporary philosophers, who not only do not have foundations
for their own philosophy, but even claim that any search for such foundations is
an illusion, a chimera, a psychological hang-up which we must grow out of. Marx
has apparently revealed the political bias underlying class consciousness and a
philosophy is merely the expression of class ideology. Freud has uncovered the
psychological need for God, for stability, for a view of the world but these are
merely props and have no value in themselves. Nietzsche combined these attacks
with his own blistering indictments of any form of knowledge, morality, or claim
to truth. We would seem to be condemned, like characters in an existentialist
play, to continue to philosophize but with no hope of ever reaching any kind of
coherent conclusion.
It is indeed a strange scenario. You have the so-called anti-foundationalists
claiming that it is an illusion to seek for philosophical foundations; yet they
are fairly clear and explicit about where they stand themselves, about their own
foundations or lack of foundations which amounts to the same thing. You have
relativists claiming that all is relative, that there is no such thing as
absolute truth; and yet they seem to be very dogmatic in propounding their
views. You have skeptics explaining that we can [5] know nothing; but yet they
are convinced of the truth of their own position. It is then clear from the
contemporary situation that it is not an easy thing to establish foundations for
a philosophy without falling into dogmatism, relativism or nihilism.
In a stable traditional society it was relatively easy to
know where you stood. You accepted the beliefs and values of the society and
handed them on to the next generation. It was a matter of repeating the past: no
initiative was required, emphasis was on the community rather than the
individual, it was a matter of conformity, the individual was not expected to
show innovation or personal discrimination.
But nowadays everything seems to be changing. Technological
developments impose changes on our economic modes of production; social and
cultural changes follow to integrate new ways of doing things into a whole way
of life. Historical studies have familiarized us with the idea that the past is
different from the present, not only in political and social institutions but
also in their meanings and values; cultures are changing, intermingling,
shifting, incorporating new elements all the time. Languages have a history: the
English of the nineteenth century is not the same as that of the twentieth.
Meanings change with these changes of language.
Is there anything that remains the same?
Is there any permanence to truth?
If so, where is that permanence to be found?
Philosophy has traditionally been the area for solving these
overall problems of truth and value. But nowadays there is a plurality of
philosophies; even there one finds oneself faced with a choice of philosophies.
In order to become a student of a philosophy one must also decide which
university to attend, which books to read, which courses to follow, which
position to adopt. We seem to be caught in a catch twenty-two: we need to be
already wise in order to learn about wisdom; we have to be already good in order
to learn about goodness. Philosophies are many and we already need criteria in
order to discriminate among them. [6]
An alternative might be to 'Follow Science.' Science has been
so successful; scientists have a method, they have technology, they can do so
many things, solve problems of the universe; they seem to be able to do
anything. However, scientists do not seem to have much to say about morals; they
are not great at giving an account of their own method; something beyond science
seems to be demanded. Since this is not very convincing as a worldview, you
might be attracted to a benevolent eclecticism, namely, pick and choose from
science, philosophy, New Age, Eastern meditation, etc. This might satisfy for a
time, but like the house built on sand it will eventually fall.
The thesis of this text is that personal philosophical
foundations are possible and indeed obligatory. By foundations I simply mean
taking a position on the basic issues of knowing, being, the universe, truth and
values and being able to defend that position intelligently and reasonably.
These foundations are not to be found in the formulated propositions of a
philosophy or a tradition. They are to be found in a patterned set of mental
activities by which we think and know and decide. This set of cognitive
activities is common to all philosophies, cultures and traditions; this set of
activities by which we discern the truth and evaluate moral and religious
questions is, in fact, the source of all philosophies, opinions, truths, and
beliefs. We all perform these cognitive activities whether or not we are yet
able to identify them clearly. By identifying these activities we can make
explicit the foundations of our own intellectual life while at the same time
honing a tool for discriminating between the various philosophies present in
contemporary culture.
It is also our thesis that this cognitive analysis reveals
the way we should think and know; implicit in the procedures of thinking
and knowing are the norms or imperatives which are the source of all logics,
moral laws and methods. Our examination of mental processes manifests not only
how the mind works, but how it should work. The mind is dynamic, developing,
pushing towards a goal of better understanding and knowing. If we can recognize
its imperatives we can recognize the source of all logics, methodologies and
procedures; we will have found the foundations [7] we are seeking, the
underlying dynamic, the source of both permanence and change.
This can be done fully only step by step one issue at a time;
it cannot be done all at once. There are no facile solutions. The process
demands personal self-examination; it takes time and effort. But it is an
enormously liberating experience to find that the key to truth and goodness lies
in our hearts and minds. We do not have to depend on any Authority or Teacher or
Philosophy, to attain to it.
2. Clarifications and Presuppositions. Let us just be
clear about the aims and presuppositions of this text. We are not just proposing
another theory or possibility but suggesting a journey of self-discovery.
Starting point. Where do we start? Euclid started his
great work in geometry with a set of axioms, definitions and principles; he then
applied these to simple straight lines, triangles, circles and later to
three-dimensional bodies such as spheres, cylinders and cones. His approach is a
model of system, and the presupposition of many disciplines is that all
respectable study must emulate it.
Some modern philosophers (Kant and Hume for instance) started
with principles and definitions regarding the extent and possibility of human
knowing, and worked on from there, but in this case that procedure seems rather
bizarre. How can one reasonably lay down the preconditions for knowing without
being already engaged in the activity of knowing? Can we step out of ourselves
with our prejudices and limits in order to establish what these limits are?
Other contemporary philosophers have tried to work out a presuppositionless
philosophy, for example Husserl. But is there such a thing as a philosophy with
no definitions, principles or axioms that have been learned within a tradition?
These more recent ventures do not seem to have been successful, either.
Our approach is to start with the subject in his native
bewilderment and confusion - with you and me. Start where we are in the present
situation in the unfolding drama of history. Philosophy is not just learning
about a system of definitions, principles and conclusions; it is more a matter
of a series of spirals, movements forward and backward. Let us move slowly
towards clarity, [8] comprehension and depth. Let us sort out slowly and
painstakingly what we actually know and how we have come to know it. Let us
learn from our mistakes, identify why we made them, and root them out with all
their implications. Let us look at the actual unfolding of knowing and not at
the abstract possibility of knowing. Human knowing is contingent: it is not as
it is of necessity and could have been different. Hence the only way to discover
the power and limits of human knowing is to observe the facts: what it can do,
what it can not do. Let us try to discover the possibility and limits of human
knowing from within the process. It is in actually knowing that we discover the
criterion for correct knowing.
Get to the Source. What are we looking for? We are
looking for a unity behind the diversity presented to us by contemporary
culture. We are looking for foundations to guide us through the challenges and
difficulties we encounter. When faced with a series of conflicting theories, or
even a succession of successful theories, there comes a point when we have to
ask: where do theories come from? What purpose do they serve? We live in a state
of cultural diversity. Why are there so many cultures? Are they all equal? Can
we criticize the culture of another? We are surrounded by pluralism of cultures,
lifestyles, moral values, levels of education, class differentiation, ethnic
diversity, specializations, job stratifications: what is legitimate and what is
not legitimate? What is authentic and what is not authentic? What is the source
of our intractable disagreements about a philosophy of life? Particularly, why
are there so many alternative theories of knowledge and how do we choose between
them?
All these questions invite us to look at the human mind, to
examine the process of understanding, to observe how scientists actually operate
in actually formulating and verifying theories and judging the success or
failure of these ideas. Instead of producing armchair epistemological theories
we mean to look at the data, the experience of knowing. In this case the data
happen to be how the mind operates in its movement from questions to
conclusions.
Subjectivity. Where are these foundations to be found? We
ground our search within the knowing subject. Some contemporary philosophies
rule out of court any appeal to subjectivity. The [9] empiricist tradition in
particular demands an appeal to sensible data for verification; they wonder how
can you appeal to invisible, private, mental operations; how can I be sure that
your mental operations are the same as my mental operations? For existentialists
the subjective means the world of feelings, experience, drama and tragedy - to
be explored by all means but it is not for them the place to look for the first
principles of philosophy. Others fear that if you start your philosophy in the
field of the subjective you will never be able to get out of it to the objective
world.
Nevertheless, we maintain that one must look to the knowing
subject in order to find the facts. There are facts about the material universe
which are studied in the natural sciences; there are also facts about the
workings of the human mind which are equally true, equally important, and very
accessible if you use the right approach. To the objection that this study of
the activity of knowing is simply psychology, I would counter that any
discipline that can help us to answer the above questions should be used to do
so. Here we use the insights of cognitive psychology but only to go beyond
psychology to an invariant cognitional structure, a cognitional theory and an
epistemology.
Certain/Probable. What kind of foundations? Sometimes
there is an assumption that knowledge to be knowledge must be absolutely
certain, completely necessary and permanently true. If we set unreasonable
expectations we will never reach the goal; let us see what we can know and then
judge whether that knowledge is necessary or contingent, probable or certain,
permanent or temporary. Let us not presume that we must proceed by deduction or
by induction; let us rather look at how in fact great thinkers have proceeded,
what methods they have used, how they verified their conclusions and whether the
conclusions are certain, probable or merely possible. There is a growing
realization in today's intellectual climate that most of our life and knowledge
deals with varying degrees of probability. Maybe Descartes was asking too much
when he set indubitability as the criterion of knowledge.
Integrating framework. Do these foundations include
everything? If a philosophy is not comprehensive, it fails in its task. We have
many specialized areas of study but the point of philosophy [10] is surely to
see how all the pieces fit together; philosophy must give us a view of the
whole, an integrating framework; it must be the broadest of all disciplines. If
philosophy cuts off some aspect of life, such as language, or logic or texts and
claims 'this is our field of study,' then it has reduced itself to the level of
a specialized science. The philosopher cannot know everything but he must be
able to fit everything together -- a whole in knowledge but not the whole of
knowledge. That is what Aristotle meant when he insisted that 'first philosophy'
must not be like the specialized sciences in cutting off parts of being but that
it must deal with being as being, that is, with everything from the widest
possible viewpoint.1
Transcultural. Is there a Western philosophy, an Eastern
philosophy, an African philosophy? Are there then three different foundations
for three different philosophies? For us, culture is the set of beliefs and
values expressed in a common way of life. A philosophy is a formal, critical,
systematic presentation of a set of methods and conclusions. It is legitimate
that there be different cultures. But I would hold that all human beings have
something fundamental in common and that that is the foundation for one
philosophy which is neither Western nor Eastern nor African in that it is common
to all. Behind the pluralism of cultures there is our common humanity. The
patterned set of mental activities to which we appeal is part of this common
heritage.
Concentrates on knowing; brackets choosing. In some cases
you can only do one thing at a time; in this text we make the difficult decision
to concentrate on intellectual foundations and leave question of values, ethics
and religion aside. To retrieve a philosophical foundation for truth in the
present climate of opinion is no small task; it will require slow, steady
concentration on difficult matters, a certain asceticism, and discipline.
Hopefully the text is adequate to that challenge. In our epilogue, however, we
will briefly suggest how our method could be extended to establishing a moral
philosophy and religious values.
Who are we to learn from? Are we on our own? Do we have to
start from scratch? We are looking for foundations which do not depend on any
Authority, but rather on what we are as human [11] beings. Nevertheless we do
need a guide. The one I have found most helpful is Bernard Lonergan.
3. Life, Writings and Ideas of Bernard Lonergan.2
Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984), a Canadian of Irish ancestry, entered the Society
of Jesus completing the normal stages of formation -- novitiate in Guelph,
scholastic philosophy along with the classics and mathematics at Heythrop
College, three years teaching, and four years theology at the Gregorian
university in Rome. Assigned to do his doctorate in theology, Lonergan was
given, by chance, the topic of grace and freedom in the writings of Aquinas.
Previously he had shown little interest in Aquinas, being more drawn to Plato,
Augustine, Newman, and the themes of method and the philosophy of history.
Lonergan spent the next eleven years of his life 'working up
to the mind of Aquinas,'3first on the
theme of grace and freedom, and then on cognitional theory. He found in Aquinas
a very sophisticated and dynamic account of the activity of human understanding
as it grasps the intelligible in the sensible and moves on to form a judgment as
a result of a process of reflection. Since current accounts of Thomist
cognitional theory neglected the activity of understanding and overemphasized
the role of concepts and of judgment as a connection between concepts, Lonergan
was amazed to find that Aquinas' own account squared with his personal
experience of knowing. Further, Aquinas had found in human knowing the analogy
for the processions of the Trinity. This historical research was first published
in five articles in Theological Studies4and
later in book form, Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas.5
Lonergan was acutely aware of the situation of the Catholic
Church in the 50's and 60's as it experienced the transformation of the Second
Vatican Council. His conviction was that the Church had isolated itself from the
world of science, technology, social change and modern philosophy since the time
of the Council of Trent and, thus, had a certain amount of catching up to do.
However, Lonergan was interested in long-term solutions and in laying the basis
for a truly contemporary and effective theology, not in squabbles over specific
issues. This required, first, some groundwork in philosophy, so he started work
on his great masterpiece, Insight: A Study of [12] Human Understanding.6
This formidable tome of 785 pages transposed the metaphysical categories of
Aquinas on human knowing into psychological categories more familiar to a
contemporary reader.
One could summarize Insight as answering three basic
questions: What am I doing when I am knowing? Why is doing that knowing? and
What do I know when I perform these activities? These three areas of inquiry
could be called, respectively, cognitional theory, epistemology, and
metaphysics. The reversal of the order here was significant, as most Scholastics
presumed that metaphysics had priority and that epistemology was to be
understood in metaphysical terms. Lonergan disagreed; his account begins with
the actual process of coming to understand as experienced in mathematics, in the
empirical sciences, in psychology. This approach confirmed what Aquinas had to
say on the process of knowing and transposed the issue into contemporary terms.
Lonergan then added chapters to show the possibility of ethics, of a natural
knowledge of God, and of an openness to religion. Insight was written
over a period of five years, from 1949 to 1953.
Appointed to teach dogmatic theology at the Gregorian
University in Rome, Lonergan then turned his thoughts to the problems of a
theology now absorbing the after-effects of the decrees of the Second Vatican
Council, as well as German advances in historical studies, the specializations
needed for studying biblical languages, new emphasis on literary forms and
cultural variations. This period was to culminate in the publication of Method
in Theology7 in 1972. He spent the
remaining years of his life teaching Macroeconomics mostly at Boston College.
My conviction is that Insight will eventually finds
its place in the history of philosophy alongside such classics as the Metaphysics
of Aristotle and the Critique of Kant. It is original, groundbreaking,
rigorous and comprehensive. It is not just another plausible or even correct
theory of knowledge; rather, it is an entry into another way of doing philosophy
which makes it personal and verifiable. It is an invitation to a personal
appropriation of our own intellectual potential and the implementation of norms
which are immanent and operative in each one of us. Lonergan's thought enables
us both to [13] keep our balance amidst the difficulties of the contemporary
public forum and to find the foundations we must have for a coherent theological
worldview.
4. Communications. Insight is a text that will be
studied, appropriated and eventually appreciated for what it is: a work of
genius. It has the potential to transform our way of thinking and verifying and
philosophizing. The long-term implications are vast. Just as Aristotle's
metaphysics and logic was the foundation for the Middle Ages, the time will
surely come when Insight grounds the cultural development of another
age hopefully not too far from now. But to appreciate the riches of Insight
is not so easy. Lonergan's writing is serious, uncompromising, and rigorous. He
appeals to mathematical and scientific examples which are beyond the ken of many
of us lesser mortals. In a text nearly eight hundred pages long we find one
diagram, no sex, no jokes, much difficult and new terminology. Insight is
not written for the fainthearted. It was written with the deliberate intention
of leaving no stone unturned, and no gaps in the argument. It was written by
Lonergan at the height of his intellectual powers in four short years as a
propaedeutic to work on method in theology. It seems to have been addressed to
his intellectual peers in the field of philosophy and theology, professors,
specialists. It was not written for the popular market of best sellers. It needs
a commentary rather than a summary.
Lonergan's work is known and appreciated by an increasing
number of enthusiastic followers. There are many publications, journals, centers
of research, courses, study groups and Internet websites. Publication of the
collected works in twenty-two volumes is well advanced. Although belonging to a
fairly narrow tradition of Catholic scholastic philosophy and theology,
Lonergan's work has relevance to the whole of contemporary culture. He has much
to say that is of value, he offers answers to many contemporary problems. Yet,
he is little known outside the immediate circle of Catholic theology and
philosophy. There seems to be a communications gap. While Lonergan's treatment
of such concepts as foundations, mental acts, metaphysics and god, does fly in
the face of much contemporary wisdom, it is my conviction that the real
difficulty in communication Lonergan is that he is asking us to move into the
[14] third stage of meaning. He is inviting us to become aware of intellect at
work in our own discovery and learning. This is not just another cognitional
theory, however difficult, in a long line of theories from Socrates to Sartre;
it is a shift in our way of thinking, a move to a higher perspective, a
discovery of our own minds and their potential. It is essentially a call to a
personal discovery of how our own minds work, what understanding produces and
how we can be sure of our knowing.
If Lonergan were formulating another theory of knowledge, it
would be relatively easy to explain it, reduce it to its parts, give examples,
agree or disagree, quote his works, refer to commentators and interpreters, and
write a learned tome covering his system, its antecedents and its implications.
But if Lonergan represents a move into a whole new stage of meaning, and if he
is inviting you and me to follow, we do so not by understanding a theory but by
appropriating, making our own, the activities and products of our minds. Hence,
if one is to communicate Lonergan's ideas, it can only be by sharing personal
experiences: me communicating to you my own experience of intellectual
development, giving you every help to follow and using Lonergan as a prop or
guide which can be dispensed with once you discover the greater Authority of
your own mind.
But there is also the other aspect of the matter, the need to
make the thought of Lonergan accessible to a wider audience. That too is the aim
and conviction guiding this text. There are genuine difficulties in
communicating this philosophy; none the less it can be done at the level of
University undergraduate studies. Insight fits in well with a traditional
seminary curriculum, where cosmology becomes cognitional theory, epistemology
deals with judgment and objectivity; metaphysics, ethics, philosophy of religion
can be guided by the later chapters. My experience teaching has convinced me
that this is not only possible but a liberating experience for the students and
a joy and satisfaction to teach. It is possible to substitute more rudimentary
examples better suited to the educational level and culture of the students than
the somewhat difficult examples of Insight. [15]
It is a hazardous task to simplify and popularise a great
thinker; there is an ever-present danger of missing the point, of leaving out
important ideas, of distorting the import of his argument. The danger is there
and no one of lesser stature that the original thinker can claim to be immune
from it. But the attempt is made with the hope that any possible distortion will
be removed when the student is enabled to take up the original text for himself
and go beyond our initial oversimplifications.
I write, then, not as a scholar but as a teacher. If this
were primarily a work of scholarship it would involve much quoting, explaining,
comparing with other authors, giving historical references, displaying one's
expertise in the details and subtleties. But I write as a teacher, trying to
simplify difficult matter, to use helpful examples, to proceed step by step, to
focus on the really important matter of self-appropriation. This text is an
effort in communications,8 to make
accessible the riches of Insight.
This is not a book about Lonergan as an Authority, rather we
use him as a guide to a way of thinking. It is not written for Lonergan scholars
and specialists but for teachers and students. There are some basic quotations
and references so that we can keep in touch with his thought; it may be used as
an introduction to his thinking. If you can tackle the original so much the
better. Concentrating on essentials inevitably involves simplification,
eliminating certain materials. This has been most difficult and may offend some
experts. I have concentrated on the notion of intellectual self-appropriation as
the key to all Lonergan's thought and the strength of his position.
For whom is this text written? For the educated reflective
person trying to take stock of his cultural or philosophical foundations. For
the student of philosophy similarly bewildered by the variety of positions
presented to him. For teachers of philosophy who want to communicate some
personal foundations for a way of life as well as information about philosophy
and philosophers. For those who want an introduction to the thought of Bernard
Lonergan. For anyone concerned with cultural foundations. For students of
theology, science, historical sciences, who want a framework within which their
discipline can flourish and contribute to progress rather than [16] decline. For
the philosophy of education and those concerned with the preservation and
communication of truth and values.
The style of this text is necessarily more personal and
informal than is usual in a book on philosophy. It is about discovering your own
potential to understand and know, a kind of do-it-yourself approach: its
essential aim and purpose is to help you to become aware of the activity of
understanding and the norms inherent in the proper unfolding of the desire to
know. I will consistently appeal to my own experience of coming to know as the
basis for helping you to make the same transition. Self-appropriation is the
foundation of the ability to communicate and that effects the style of writing
and presentation.
Each chapter begins with some preliminary exercises. Although
you will save time if you skip them, you will then be in danger of missing the
whole point. The exercises are offered to stimulate the intellectual experiences
which are the subject matter of that chapter. In its primary focus the book is
about you; not about theories of knowledge in general, or foundations for
philosophy, or about Lonergan, or about mathematics, but about you. Some
comments are added at the end of each chapter about these preliminary exercises.
These are only sample exercises and can be supplemented with examples from your
own area of expertise.
Endnotes are given to help hook into more technical
presentations of Lonergan's thought and also to help those who may not be
familiar with philosophic problems and terminology. Each chapter is a unit for
reflection, appropriation, discussion and implementation. The text can show the
way, propose the exercises, lay out the definitions, but it is the reader who
has to do the exercises and recognize what the definitions refer to in your own
personal experience.
5. Summary of the Argument. The text is divided into two
parts referred to in rather loose terms as 'Thinking' and 'Knowing'; more
technically they could be called 'Direct and Inverse Insights' and 'Reflective
Insights and Judgment'. The first part identifies a level of intellectual
activity in which we think up bright ideas, explore the possible connections and
causal relations between [17] things, and formulate hypotheses. The second part
considers how we affirm or deny these hypotheses as true or false. We focus on
the rational process by which we come to know something as true; because our
culture has such problems with this aspect it is necessary to spell this out in
great detail.
We start with the framework of the three stages of meaning
because it helps us to grasp the necessity of moving individually and
collectively to the third stage of meaning. It is very enlightening and unifying
to view our intellectual history from this perspective and helps immensely to
understand the malaise of our present time as one of transition. Intellectual
self-appropriation is the method we propose for the process. Because it is new
and difficult it needs to be explained and justified; we come to know about the
activity of understanding by adverting to what we do when we understand
something correctly. In chapter two our method is applied to the simplest,
clearest examples that we can find and the characteristics of this activity are
identified. The constant challenge to the reader is to recognize these
activities in his own knowing.
Describing and explaining are two different but valid ways of
understanding; they are distinguished as two different perspectives on the same
thing. Description is the easiest; it comes most naturally but does not
encourage precision or definition. Explanation is a leap to relating things to
one another, giving explanatory precision and accuracy of measurement. We
explore how these activities are related; why does describing always move to
explaining; what kinds of insights are involved? In chapter four we note the
peculiar type of insight which grasps not what is there to be understood, but
the absence of an expected intelligibility; this is the basis for knowing
probabilities rather than systematic regularities.
In chapter five we identify how understanding develops; it is
dynamic; insights cluster into unities, higher viewpoints, generalizations;
understanding deepens, becomes more comprehensive, more flexible, more
discriminating. Individual insights pass into the habitual texture of the mind
and form the habits of inquiry and research, leading to mastery of a field. We
get some idea of the infinite flexibility and potential of our human
intelligence. [18]
In part two the text shifts from thinking to knowing by
noting the differences between a proposition entertained simply as a possibility
and a proposition affirmed or denied as true. Judgment emerges from a reflective
insight which grasps the sufficiency of the evidence for the positing of a
judgment. This is a grasp of unity in a multiplicity, a sweeping together of
very diverse elements to see in their unity the necessity of affirming the
judgment. As we dwell on reflective understanding we discover certain norms
which are immanent in that activity.
Finally, we take stock of our progress by putting together in
summary form the interrelated series of activities which we have discovered to
constitute human knowing. We note that our resulting account of cognitional
structure is not open to basic revision. We critique the processes of scientific
knowing and find them much inferior to our grasp of cognitional structure. In
that unrevisable normative structure we find the personal foundations for each
one of us to stand on our own two feet and proclaim that this is true.
We then discuss intellectual conversion. For the first time
we recognize and identify the dialectic that operates in human understanding:
imagination struggles with intelligence, looking with understanding, the
immediate of sensation with mediation of intelligence. We use four different
images or terminologies to explore and objectify this experience of intellectual
conversion, hoping that at least one will click for every reader. Intellectual
conversion gives us a base for discriminating between correct and incorrect
philosophical and scientific positions. Even mistaken philosophies can make a
contribution to the clarification of the ultimate goal of a comprehensive
wisdom.
As a result of our odyssey in cognitional self-appropriation
we come to see that objectivity and subjectivity are not polar opposites but
mutually complementary. We move from subjective to objective not by way of an
imaginary bridge but by way of a set of judgments that implicitly define the
subject and the object. Our philosophy is one of critical realism: the real is
what is affirmed in a true judgment.
The concluding epilogue gives an indication of the
possibilities opened up by this breakthrough to the third stage of meaning. It
[19] indicates how our method can be used to build a metaphysics and an ethics.
We discuss the role of philosophy in relation to culture in general with special
reference to Africa. We are living in an age of transition from 'common sense'
and 'theory' into the world of interiority; because it is a transition it is
accompanied by confusion and controversy; but because it is a breakthrough it is
full of opportunity and hope for development, progress and wisdom.
End Notes
1 Aristotle, Metaphysics,
Book Gamma (Four). He opens by making this
distinction between the special sciences which cut off part of the material
world as their field of study and first philosophy which must include
everything. Aristotle used the term 'first philosophy' where we would use
'metaphysics.'
2 See Frederick Crowe, Lonergan,
(Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1992) An excellent short intellectual
biography by a close friend and colleague
3 F. Crowe, Lonergan, 41.
4 Theological Studies 1946-1949.
5 Bernard Lonergan, Verbum: Word and
Idea in Aquinas, edited by Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran,
Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 2, (Toronto: Toronto University Press,
1997). This studies Aquinas on understanding and judging with a view to
identifying the rational process which is the human analogy for the divine
processions.
6 Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A Study
of Human Understanding, Edited by Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M.
Doran, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 3, (Toronto: Toronto University
Press, 1992). First published by Longmans, Green and Co in 1957.
7 Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology,
(London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1972).
8 Communications is one of the functional
specializations outlined in Method in Theology. I use the term in
that technical sense as well as the more general meaning of communications.
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