4/12/2008
Eric Voegelin, Plato and Aristotle, vol. 3 - Order and History
Science and Contemplation, Part II, chap. 8, pp. 293-314
Joanne Tetlow, J.D., Ph.D.
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"Political Science and the Intellect"
Living in a similar, but not the same, historical polis as Plato, Aristotle maintains the Idea of the Good and desire to actualize the
true spirit and soul in his political theory; however, as Voegelin immediately points out at the beginning of this chapter, Aristotle's contemplative
man is not the Platonic spiritual founder of the Republic and the Laws. As the title of the chapter indicates, Science and
Contemplation are essentially related, but in a less theocratically compact way than in Plato. Aristotle is Plato's pupil and enters into a
common, yet distinct, historic reality. Aristotle’s contemplative man does not create a hierarchy of goods and impose a spiritual will as
Plato's philosopher-king; rather, living in a socially more differentiated society, he as the mature man, or spoudaios, establishes the
divine measure and ethical standard by which to judge politics.
Voegelin's analysis deals with two major questions about Aristotle:
(1) If politics is a general science about human action with the end of the highest
good (eudaimonia) for both man and society, why is it classified as a practical science limited to the virtue of prudence?
(2) If the life of contemplation or intellect (nous) is the highest good for
man, because it represents the divine aspect, and all happiness is to be found in the polis, how can politics obtain the good end when it is based on the
intellectual virtue, phronesis, and not contemplation or nous?
In addressing the first problem, Voegelin looks to the relation between Aristotle's Ethics and Politics. In the Ethics,
Aristotle asserts that the ethical virtues of justice, prudence, temperance, and courage are not natural faculties and must be created by habit, and
since a limited number of people acquire ethical virtue, laws and institutions are needed to enforce essential moral norms. Voegelin sees this as a
contraction of politics inasmuch as the lawgiver decides what institutions are necessary to produce ethical excellence in the citizenry. In contrast
to Plato’s theocratic vision, Aristotle's politics as a practical science requires phronesis as an intellectual virtue. Political science is
prudence, not the spiritual vision of the Good-Plato's Agathon. Nonetheless, as Voegelin argues, the truth of politics as a prudential science arises
from the truth of the myth. The principles of right action according to reason are available, because they are embedded in the habits of certain
individuals. It is the mature man (spoudaios) who knows ethical excellence, because he lives it. As Voegelin states in a Lincolnian
way, "Ethics is a science of mature people, by mature people, and for mature people." (301) In Aristotle's political theory, the philosopher is not the
ordering force in society, it is mature man who has practical wisdom setting the normative standard for morality in society. The constitutionalism
of politics are the institutional framework established for the uneducable mass, who do not possess ethical virtue.
Moreso than Plato, in Aristotle there is a distinct difference between ethics as universal and for all mankind, and politics as dependent upon
historical reality. Politics as the general science of human action includes ethical virtues and political constitutionalism. As such, it
is not the activity of contemplation or nous. The philosopher stands apart from politics in a sense, because contemplation is an intellectual
activity shared by few. Although it is the highest happiness, because it is the highest part of the rational soul and the divine aspect in man, few
men are bios theoretikos, which brings up the second problem. If nous is the divine part in man, and it is apolitical, what good can
it provide for politics? It is by analogy. What Voegelin's identifies as Aristotle's conservatism is Aristotle's unwillingness to break with
the myth in the sense that as the polis is self-sufficient in itself when obtaining the highest good so is man. Only the contemplative man who has
the divine aspect of nous is a law unto himself—the standard of the divine measure. In politics, the mature man has the same function for the
polis. In short, both political science and contemplation achieve the same highest good for both man and society inasmuch as they each are
self-sufficient; and thus in an analogous way represent the divine.
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