Current Seminar:
• Voegelin’s Anamnesis
11/11/2006
Part III: What is Political Reality?
I. Science and Reality
II. The Consciousness of the Ground
III. Linguistic Indices and Type-Concepts
Joanne Tetlow
This is Part A of a two-part analysis of Voegelin’s dense and provocative chapter addressing the fundamental question of “what is political
reality?” Posing the question as such signals his philosophy of consciousness that is to follow. The more common question, “what is political
science?” is not the query, because Voegelin is after something more foundational than a social science discipline. He is interested in “reality”
not “science” per se. Nevertheless, his first sub-heading in the chapter deals with “science and reality.” What is the difference?
Voegelin observes that political science and political reality have a peculiar relationship, namely, unlike natural science, political science
has as its object the structure of reality in which those who seek to know it already participate. In other words, the knowledge of political
science is achieved only by participation in political reality—the field of knowledge or its object is the same. In contrast to natural
science, where a physical object exists outside of the realm of human participation, political science deals with exactly that—human participation
in the political reality to which it seeks to understand. Thus, political science at its core is about a “noetic” interpretation of man,
society, and things. But, political reality is not a “thing” about which propositions can be formulated. Rather, political reality has
its origin in the concrete consciousness of man and through the noetic exegesis of that consciousness lived in reality man can seek and find the
true knowledge of order.
How is accomplished? Thomists may be bothered by Voegelin’s clear anti-metaphysical bent. Voegelin sees metaphysical propositions and
the Aristotelian form-matter distinction as deformations of true knowledge of the divine ground of being. Propositions are a dogmatization of
the experiential participation of the divine ground—this is a problem, because dogmatizing itself is a distortion of truth, and dogmatizing leads
further to a separation of the underlying experience of order which gave rise to the dogmas themselves. Hence, systems, ideologies, theologies,
philosophies of propositional knowledge are postulated in such a way as to be divorced from political reality and the concrete consciousness of
man. Moreover, truth as an “object” does not capture the “tension” toward the divine ground that will exist so long as we live in the
metaxy (in-between). What is Voegelin’s antidote to this problematic?
Voegelin articulates his view of the noetic interpretation of political reality. This view can only be understood by recognizing the
distinction between noetic and non-noetic interpretations of reality. Prior to the evocation of noesis or Aristotle’s nous, the compact
world of myth was constituted by a primary experience of non-noetic interpretation. Noetic meaning ratio was not present in the
pre-Greek world before the discovery of nous (reason, ratio) in philosophy. Nevertheless, the discovery of reason by Plato and
Aristotle did not erase or make irrelevant the prior compact world of myth. To the contrary, the noetic exegesis which became available rested
on the non-noetic self-interpretation of reality. The non-noetic experience is the background for the noetic exegesis which can critique and
advance the non-noetic understanding of political reality. Thus, there is not a separation of noetic and non-noetic, but rather, a progression
from non-noetic mythical knowledge to noetic consciousness of the divine ground of being. It is Aristotle’s nous which describes the
movement of ratio as both human and divine. That is, through reason man has a desire for the ground of being and the divine ground of
being moves man to be attracted to the same. Nous is a mutual participation of the two nous entities: human and
divine. Although men have a multitude of modes of experience of the divine with a corresponding multitude of symbols expressing those
experiences, there is only ONE divine ground. I think this is a crucial insight by Voegelin. Without this, we would be floundering in the
world of theological, philosophical, and moral relativism—there is ONE DIVINE GROUND. And, men realize this as they engage the noetic search
for the right order of being.
Since the non-noetic and noetic interpretations work together toward the divine, they can be considered equivalent experiences of participation
in the ground, albeit not equal. For Voegelin, noetic exegesis yields knowledge of the truth of monotheism, whereas, non-noetic interpretations
are less differentiated experiences of a compact world of myth of many gods in nature, or polytheism. Thus, there is a truth differential
between non-noetic and noetic exegesis. The discovery of reason by the Greeks is an advance of differentiation yielding true knowledge of the
order of being. Voegelin’s type-concept of “being-thought-symbol” explains man’s mutual participation in being and thinking. Noesis can be
symbolized by linguistic indices of modes of participation along the poles which provide the boundaries of the tension we live in. Even though
there is one divine ground of being, there are a range of different modes of experience and knowledge along the continuum between the
poles. Ratio makes transparent the structure of consciousness in man and furnishes a criterion for the correct symbol of the termini of
participation, i.e., of man and the divine ground of being. In other words, noetic interpretations yield knowledge, while non-noetic
interpretations yield beliefs and opinions.
To conclude, Voegelin notes that classical noesis provided ratio as the structure of consciousness, the luminosity of consciousness, and
the historical truth differential (between compact world of myth and differentiated reality of nous). Modern noesis has the job of
reestablishing consciousness to address the problems of perspectival reality, intentionality of consciousness towards reality, and the form of reality
intended by consciousness and the problems of the content and loss of reality. This “misery of dogmatism” is principally caused by the symbols
of noesis becoming removed from the underlying experience of concrete consciousness of nous toward the divine ground of being, which had given
rise to the symbols in the first place.
Understanding political reality by propositions and objectification has led to deformations and second realities—a belief that there is such a
thing as absolute knowledge or an understanding of the whole by constructing systems, metaphysical postulates, ideologies, etc., which all define
ratio not in terms of the concrete consciousness of man towards the divine ground of being, but in terms of intellectual dogmas separated from
man’s participation in political reality.
What is Political Reality? Part B
IV. Tensions in Reality of Knowledge
V. Concrete Consciousness
VI. On the Function of Noesis
Having articulated what political reality is, Voegelin describes how political reality becomes knowledge. The core identifier and carrier
is “noesis.” It is noetic consciousness of the divine ground which brings reality to knowledge. The concrete participation of
“being-moved-toward-the-ground by the ground” discloses to the participant by luminosity of consciousness knowledge which is understood as
reality. It is noesis, or ratio, that does this. Understood in the classical sense, noesis differentiates consciousness of the
divine ground from other parts of comprehensive knowledge. Voegelin is not saying that noetic knowledge is the only form of knowledge, but that
noesis isolates ratio while other experiences of the divine, e.g. pneumatic, the love of God, etc., also disclose truth. Ratio is
quite important as it is an explicit control of what constitutes reality and knowledge. It is an instrument of critique which can critically
assess non-noetic interpretations of reality, such as the pneumatic. Noesis also recognizes that tensions in the reality of knowledge
remain. Voegelin mentions three.
The first tension occurred shortly after classical noesis, or the Hellenic phase, where after true concept of God, man, and the world occurred
through noetic differentiation from the prior non-noetic compact experience, it derailed into the philosophical dogmatism of the schools leading to
Epicurean skepticism. The Jewish-Christian revelation, although a further differentiated advance through the pneumatic experience of the
divine, experienced a loss of noetic exegesis when philosophy was made ancillary to theology. As a result, noetic exegesis was no longer
participatory interpretation of the divine ground, but dogmatic theology which led to dogmatic metaphysics and reactionary rebellions. A
subsequent third tension followed naturally from dogmatic theology to dogmatic metaphysics to dogmatic ideology such as Comte’s positivism,
which Voegelin calls a third-generation dogmatism. If one wonders why persuasion about divine reality and knowledge has lost ground, an answer
can be found in dogmatism which has undermined the noetic clarity and articulation of the origin of order as an existential tension toward the
ground. Dogmatism of whatever sort attempts to eliminate the tension, and Voegelin shows how this has continued throughout history.
What is the remedy? Getting back to the pre-dogmatic reality of knowledge and the mystery of participation. Voegelin commends Camus’s
use of the myth as a way back to pre-dogmatic experience. Unfortunately, Camus’s mythic search turned toward utopia and not
reality. Nevertheless, at least Camus recognized the dead-end road of dogmatism and sought to revitalize the real search. Voegelin also
admires Bodin’s mysticism defining true religion as the turning of a purified spirit to the true God. Bodin’s idea of conversio to escape
the dogmatomachy of literalists still held onto the tension of the symbol of the divine and the ineffability of the divine. This is what
dogmatism destroys. There is no mystery, no ineffability, no incomprehensibility as the divine eternal is immanentized and gutted into mundane
reality.
In sum, what the pre-dogmatic interpretations of classical noesis and mysticism recognize that dogmatism does not is the tension of the reality
of knowledge. And, that a balance must be maintained between the knowledge of the symbols and the knowledge of what lies behind the
symbols. Here Voegelin tips his hat to Aquinas’s “incommensurability of divine substance.” According to Voegelin, it has been in the area
of archaeology, philology, history, etc, and not political science where the latent ratio of pre-dogmatic noetic interpretations
exist. Political science has become a study of institutions which operate in the realm of ideology and secondary ideologies of
tradition. The reliance is on either new dogmatisms or old dogmatisms dressed up as “tradition.” This dogmatism occurred shortly after
Aristotle, yet, Voegelin makes this cutting remark about Aquinas:
But Thomas was the first to crystallize this misunderstanding into ‘metaphysics’
and brought about the perversion of noetic exegesis by terminologically ossifying it into a propositional science of principles, universals, and
substances. (391-2)
The rejection of metaphysics in the early modern period unfortunately included pre-dogmatic knowledge. Both were rejected leaving no noetic
science of order.
In terms of a theory of history, Voegelin asserts that the field of investigation must be the concrete consciousness of man, his entire existence,
body and soul. The idea of universal humanity is a symbol which doesn’t exist because it is not known. We are still living in time, but
what history can furnish is an understanding of what Toynbee calls civilizational societies, or Herodotus’s ecumene, and multi-cultural imperial empires
as Persia and Rome. We can understand history in terms of essential humanity not universal humanity meaning that from the experience of being we
can see human representations of the experience of the ground of being as we consider the concrete past. Those who kept the balance of
consciousness between living in time (particular) and participating in the eternity of the ground (universal) are the true representatives of essential
humanity—something stable, constant, and true.
To conclude, noesis is crucial for Voegelin as it differentiates ratio as the structure of consciousness. Further, noesis removes the
mortgages on truth such as ideological, mythical, and revelatory dogmatisms, by examining the non-noetic experiences and determining their compatibility
with the noetic knowledge of the logos of consciousness. In closing, Voegelin makes the astute observation how the “common sense” Anglo-Saxon
tradition protected itself from the dogmatisms of theology, metaphysics, and ideology. Voegelin even says that common sense is not dogmatic, but a
residue of noesis (412). Since it has no explicit noesis, it is not in danger of becoming dogmatic. Common sense is a compact rationality, a
habit of judgment, what Aristotle calls practical reason or phroensis. It works well because man is not required to have a differentiated
knowledge of noesis, only a presupposition that a noetic experience is there. However, despite the practical success of common sense—common
compact ratio—without a differentiated noetic exegesis and luminosity of consciousness of the divine ground, there is no true reality of knowledge,
an understanding of the tensions of knowledge, and how noesis functions. Thus, the lack of explicit noesis in “common sense” is double-edged—it
inoculates common ratio from dogmatism, but it also leaves it in a compact rationality that is less differentiated and therefore less rational
in the optimal sense of reality.
Anamnesis
"The Consciousness of the Ground"
Kieran Dickinson
In his essay, “The Consciousness of the Ground,” Eric Voegelin differentiates the relationship between human consciousness, reality, the divine, the
phenomenon of participation, and history, and he does so in a way that lends itself to drawing lessons at both a personal and political level.
For Eric Voegelin, human consciousness is the “place” where men and women experience the order of reality. In his discussion of the nature of
reality, Eric Voegelin walks a tightrope between the false poles of relativism/nihilism (which denies the reality of things) and objectivism (which
posits the existence of things independent of the experiencing subject). On the contrary, Eric Voegelin writes that things, gods, and man himself
do exist, though not in the way we typically believe. Reality is not that which exists outside man, and which man confronts, but “the encompassing
reality in which he himself is real as he participates.” (p. 163) Moreover, everything is real “that can be distinguished in the encompassing
reality – the gods, men, and so on.” (p. 163). (One wonders whether Eric Voegelin would say that the Norse god Thor is real or that pink
elephants on parade are real, since both can be thought of and can thus enter into human consciousness. Perhaps pink elephants on parade are
indeed real to a small child, just as Thor is real to the Norseman who goes a-viking under Thor’s banner.) Reality is not an object of knowledge
from a standpoint outside reality; rather insight into reality is insight from the perspective of who participates in reality. (p. 164)
Consciousness can be formed by myth or philosophy, both of which at their best ground consciousness in non-dogmatic openness to the
divine. Voegelin prefers philosophy to myth, since he believes that philosophy offers the more highly differentiated understanding and experience
of the divine ground. The break point from a mythological world-view to a philosophical one occurs when the universe itself is no longer seen as
divine (e.g., the planet Jupiter is no longer identified with the father of the gods) and instead the universe is seen as existing apart from the heavens
(i.e., it becomes “worldly” or “secular”). “The place of a cosmos full of gods is taken up by a dedivinized world, and, correlative to it, the
divine is concentrated into the transcending ground of being.” (p. 159) This break, however, leads to problems if the philosopher closes
himself to the tension embedded into his consciousness of seeking the divine ground of reality.
Consciousness’s structure, per Eric Voegelin, is precisely the tension of the knowing questioning about the ground, whether through mythology
or through “the luminosity of noetic consciousness.” (p. 154) That is what is common to man at all times and places. For Eric
Voegelin, this tension toward the ground is universal, but it is not “an object for propositions.” (p. 156) Eric Voegelin is highly
suspicious of attempts to conceptualize and dogmatize the experience of the participation of human consciousness in the divine ground.
Consciousness is the reality of human participation in reality, grounded in the divine, and it is “characterized by a presence of experience that
puts phases of lower grades of truth behind itself, as the past.” (p. 165) What we experience as the changeability of reality is what we
call “history.” History is thus constituted by consciousness.
Anamnesis
"The Concrete Consciousness"
Br. Dunstan Robidoux OSB
When Voegelin speaks about our human concrete consciousness, he speaks not simply about our consciousness as if he were speaking only about the life
of our souls. Our consciousness is concrete because it is incarnate. It exists in union with a body and so our concrete consciousness is
such that it has to cope with a number of different conditions, meet more than one set of needs. The problems that concrete human living presents
to us require that we determine some kind of order, find some kind of order that can relate the different needs that we must meet in an intelligent and
wise way.
Our concrete human consciousness is, however, subject to bias. One bias derives from an one-sided form of rationalism which speaks of the mind
or the human spirit in a way which is divorced from union with a body. And so, this kind of understanding leads to forms of political theory that
are utopian and idealistic. Great wrongs, many very bad judgments can then be made in the context of one form of idealism or
another. However, beyond this kind of bias, another emphasizes human bodily life to a degree which also leads to distortions in political thought
and bad policy decisions for the government of human society. In the context of materialism and materialistic forms of thinking, the value of
other goods will not be recognized. A truncation can develop in how a society understands itself and what should be the role of politics and
government.
Great care should be taken in talking about a “collective consciousness” in society since an undue focus here takes away from trying to understand
how societies rise and fall. The human social order is a complicated, complex thing and one should not engage in oversimplifications. It is
not good also to equate a social order with its organized political arrangement of things. A society is greater than any particular political
arrangement. Even if we are also tempted to use “civilization” as a criterion of judgment, this term has a limited application to studying the
human order of things. In our human history, different civilizations have existed side by side within a common political order. One thinks
of the Roman and Persian Empires. Voegelin uses the term “ecumene” for speaking of something larger and wider although “ecumene” is not entirely
adequate since its use does not cover human history in general: the “universal field of history.” However, if we are to make progress in speaking
about human history in general, it would be better to speak about “essential humanity.” By talking about “essential humanity,” one best develops
a hermeneutic which can speak about a tension which exists in human consciousness as, on the one hand, human life is pulled toward acknowledging a divine
ground for all things which would serve as a principle of order, and as, on the other hand, because of bias, we are tempted, as human beings, to not try
and work toward an ordering of one’s life that acknowledges a divine providential order of things that reaches into the concreteness of human
existence.
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